INTRODUCTION

 

Like many other urban areas in the United States, Charlotte faces challenges in controlling traffic congestion and air pollution.  In an attempt to address this problem, local officials placed a public transit sales tax measure on the ballot in 1998, based upon the adopted  2025 Plan. , The voters of Charlotte-Mecklenburg approved  a new sales tax for this long term transit development plan that featured the development of five  transit corridors that would utilize light rail and rapid bus transit.   The 70 mile, $760 million capital plan was characterized by planners as “helping the region to meet federal air quality requirements…”[1] and “reducing the total vehicle miles traveled in the region…” [2] 

 

Since that time, local transportation agencies have worked to begin implementing some of the improvements in the 2025 Plan., Optimism is high. Charlotte Area Transit System (CATS) general manager Ron Tober has expressed the hope that transit’s market share will increase markedly in the years to come:

 

I think we will be successful here in Charlotte with 15 to 20 percent (using public transportation). I think we now have 2 to 3 percent.[3]

 

This report analyzes current plans for development of the first corridor under the 2025 Plan, the South Corridor Light Rail Line and describes its impact on the balance of the system contained in the plan.

 

TRANSIT: US BACKGROUND

Transit Since World War II

At the end of World War II, approximately 35 percent of urban travel was by public transit. Immediately after the War, transit began losing market share to the automobile at a significant rate. By the time subsidies became widespread (1970), transit’s share of urban travel had fallen to 3.6 percent. Subsidies have since climbed to more than $20 billion annually, yet transit’s share of urban trips has fallen to 1.8 percent (Figure #1).[4]

 

 

Figure 1

 

Public transit has sustained its greatest market share loss among riders who have access to automobiles. From 1960 to 1990, the public transit work trip market share has declined by more than 50 percent (Figure #2).[5] As a result, transit’s dominant purpose has become mobility for low income and disabled citizens. In 1995, approximately 70 percent of transit riders did not have automobiles available for their trips.[6]  In Charlotte, the figure is higher, with 87 percent of riders not having automobiles available for their trips.[7]

 

Figure 2

 

In virtually every metropolitan area in the nation, the overwhelming majority of travel is by personal vehicles (automobiles and light trucks). Among the metropolitan areas with more than one million residents in 1990, the work trip market share of the automobile was from 63 percent to 93 percent, with only the New York metropolitan area below 79 percent.[8] Transit's market share exceeds that of the automobile in only a handful of cases, such as for commutes to six of the nation's largest downtown areas (New York, Chicago Brooklyn, Boston, San Francisco and Washington).

 

But even in these urban areas, transit carries a comparatively small percentage of commuters to employment areas outside downtown. In other cities, transit carries such a small market share that it generally has miniscule impact on traffic congestion.

Light Rail and Traffic Congestion: The Record

For some time, urban traffic congestion has been increasing. Despite transit’s small market share, there has been the hope, if not the expectation, that transit can play an important role in reducing traffic congestion. Light rail has been invoked by a number of interests as a principal strategy in the battle against traffic congestion. Moreover, since automobiles produce a significant share of air pollution, it is anticipated that encouraging drivers to use transit will have positive air quality benefits.

 

Unlike heavy rail (subway, elevated or metro) systems, which are 100 percent grade separated,  light rail generally operates at  grade.[9] Light rail is a contemporary name for the “streetcars” or “trams” that operated in most large US cities from the late 19^th century to the 1950s and 1960s. Electric power is collected from overhead lines. Because it operates generally at grade, light rail tends to be  considerably slower than subways and automobiles.^[10] Light rail can carry up to 15,000 to 25,000 riders per hour in each direction in trains of up to three cars. Examples of light rail include the St. Louis Metrolink, Portland’s MAX and the Los Angeles “Blue Line.”^[11]

 

The person carrying capacity of a single freeway lane is approximately 2,750. As a result of their high theoretical person carrying capacities, light rail systems are often suggested as an effective alternative to building more highway capacity. But, in fact, light rail usage is only a fraction of the theoretical capacities. Highly regarded systems in Portland, Dallas and St. Louis, which are among the most heavily traveled systems in the nation carry fewer than 2,000 riders per peak hour in the peak direction.[12] Generally, one-half or more of the light rail riders formerly rode bus services that were replaced by the rail service. The new ridership attracted to light rail from freeways is in fact quite  small compared to the carrying capacity of a single freeway lane.

 

The average freeway lane in US metropolitan areas that have built new light rail systems (since 1980) carries four times as many people per mile as light rail. Even signalized surface streets average twice as many people per mile as light rail.

 

There are a number of reasons why light rail fails to live up to the traffic reduction claims of its proponents. The most important are that:

 

The modern metropolitan area is far too dispersed in residential and employment locations for any mass transit facility to be able to remove a significant percentage of drivers from automobiles. Generally, transit is able to provide service that competes in time and convenience with the automobile only to a single downtown area in each metropolitan area.

 

Light rail has a particular disadvantage in travel time. On average, during peak travel periods, light rail operates only slightly faster than buses[13] and barely one-half as fast as automobiles.[14]

 

Overall transit market shares are very small. Only in the New York metropolitan area is market share higher than five percent. In most metropolitan areas, transit carries less than 1.0 percent of travel.[15] With such a small market share, even a doubling of transit ridership would have virtually no impact on traffic congestion.

 

These realities are routinely confirmed in urban rail feasibility studies, which generally show neither perceivable traffic congestion relief nor air quality benefits from building light rail systems.

 

CHARLOTTE: BACKGROUND

Demographics

Population and Growth

Charlotte is now the 32^nd largest metropolitan area in the nation, with a 1999 population of 1,417,000. Charlotte is also one of the fastest growing metropolitan areas. From 1990 to 1999, the metropolitan area grew 22 percent, ranking 8^th among the 49 metropolitan areas with more than 1,000,000 population (Table B-1, Appendix B).[16] Charlotte is also the largest metropolitan area in North Carolina. The core Mecklenburg County (also referred to as “Charlotte-Mecklenburg”) had a population of 648,400 in 1998, up 26.8 percent from 1990.

Population Density

The core of the Charlotte metropolitan area is the city of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County (Charlotte-Mecklenburg), which includes seven counties and 3,379 square miles of land area in North Carolina and South Carolina.[17] Despite being a metropolitan region, the overall population density is low, at 409 persons per square mile.[18] By comparison, five states are more dense,[19] and two (New Jersey and Delaware) are more than twice as densely populated as the Charlotte metropolitan area. The entire nation of the Netherlands, with vast expanses of agricultural land is also more than twice as dense, with at nearly 1,000 persons per square mile. Mecklenburg County, at 527 square miles, is considerably more dense than the balance of the metropolitan area, at 1,230 residents per square mile. This is a relatively low density for the core of a metropolitan area, and somewhat higher than the state of New Jersey and the Netherlands

 

US metropolitan areas are defined  using county boundaries,[20] rather than the limits of urban development. Because there is considerable variation in the size of counties across the nation, comparisons of metropolitan area population densities are misleading.[21]

 

The urbanized (developed) area: A more appropriate measure of urban density is the US Census Bureau’s “urbanized areas,”[22] which are defined by adjacent urban development. In 1990, the Charlotte urbanized area contained 455,000 residents, 65^th in the nation. This is considerably lower than the Charlotte metropolitan area’s 1990 ranking of 34^th. The urbanized area covered 242 square miles, with a population density of 1,880 per square mile.

 

Among the 41 metropolitan areas with more than 1,000,000 residents in 1990, Charlotte ranked 40^th in the percentage of residents in the core urbanized area,[23] at 39.2 percent (Table B-2, Appendix B). Only Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point ranked lower, at 18.6 percent. By comparison, the average core urbanized area accounted for 74.6 percent of its metropolitan area population. In addition to ranking next-to-last, the Charlotte urbanized area (and Greensboro-Winston-Salem-High Point to an even greater extent) was well outside the range of the non-North Carolina metropolitan areas, 11 percentage points behind 39^th ranking Hartford and 17 percentage points behind 38^th ranking San Francisco.

 

Moreover, the Charlotte urbanized area was very sparsely populated, at 37 percent below the average of the 41 areas. Only the Kansas City urbanized area, with nearly three times the population was less densely populated than the Charlotte urbanized area.

 

At the same time, North Carolina is one of the nation’s more populous states, ranking 11^th in 1998, with more than 7.5 million residents. Since 1990, North Carolina has added more than one million residents, more than all but five states. But the distribution of population in North Carolina is more dispersed  than in the other large states. Except for North Carolina, all of the 11 largest states had much larger urbanized areas. In eight of the other 10 states, the largest urbanized area ranked among the nation’s top 10. Outside of North Carolina, Ohio’s largest urbanized area ranked the lowest (Cleveland), at 21^st. In contrast, (as noted above), North Carolina’s largest urbanized area, Charlotte, ranks 65^th.

 

This suggests that Charlotte, and for that matter North Carolina metropolitan areas[24] are considerably different from those in the other large states. In each of the North Carolina metropolitan areas, much more of the metropolitan population lives outside the core urbanized area. North Carolina metropolitan areas are not only typified by comparatively low urbanized area densities, but the population tends to be more widely dispersed outside the core urbanized areas. The North Carolina metropolitan areas, such as Charlotte, experienced their greatest population growth after World War II, and thus do not have the large, dense residential or commercial cores that are typical of older metropolitan areas. As such, Charlotte and the other North Carolina areas represent the purest form yet developed of contemporary metropolitan structure.

Employment

Charlotte’s growth has been accompanied by strong employment growth. Charlotte has emerged as one of the world’s leading banking centers. As in the case of virtually all US metropolitan areas, most employment growth has been outside the central business district. Nonetheless, Charlotte’s business growth has produced a central business district (“Uptown”) with some of the nation’s tallest skyscrapers. In 1990, Uptown contained 10.8 percent of the metropolitan area’s employment.[25] Uptown was by far the most dense employment center in the area, at approximately 25 times the density of the balance of the urbanized area (Figure #3).[26] However, with approximately 50,000 jobs, Uptown Charlotte is small compared to national metropolitan standards. At least 25 metropolitan areas have downtown areas with more than 100,000 jobs.[27]

 

Figure 3

 

Transportation

Traffic Congestion

As in all major urban areas, there is concern about traffic in the Charlotte area. Nonetheless, Federal Highway Administration data indicates that Charlotte has been comparatively successful in accommodating its growing traffic. From 1982 to 1997, Charlotte’s Roadway Congestion Index (RCI) dropped 3.7 percent, from 1.08 to 1.04.[28] Charlotte, along with Houston are the only urbanized areas that experienced a reduced RCI over the period.

 

This does not mean, however, that traffic congestion is non-existent in the Charlotte area. Average work trip travel times are increasing. From 1980 to 1990, average travel time increased from 19.9 minutes to 21.6 for the work trip.[29] Nonetheless, Charlotte’s average work trip travel time remained somewhat below the major metropolitan 25.2 figure. [30]

 

Charlotte is comparatively dependent upon the automobile. In 1990, Charlotte had the highest private vehicle (automobile and light truck) work trip market share of any US metropolitan area over one million population, at 93.3 percent (Figure #4).[31]

 

Figure 4

Transit

 

In 1990, public transit accounted for 1.7 percent of work trips in metropolitan Charlotte. This is a 35 percent market share decline from the 1980 figure of 2.6 percent. In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, transit’s work trip market share was higher, at 3.4 percent, down 31 percent from the 1980 figure of 4.9 percent. Walking and working at home combined, at 4.3 percent, accounted for more work trips than public transit in Charlotte-Mecklenburg (Figure #5).[32]

Figure 5

 

 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg’s largest employment center is the central business district (CBD), Uptown., Uptown has the largest transit work trip market share in the area, at 10.4 percent. Even so, automobiles carried nearly eight times as many commuters to Uptown (83.8 percent).[33] Transit commuters to downtown had an average income at least 20 percent below that of the metropolitan area average in 1990. Outside downtown, transit commuters earn less than one-half the metropolitan average.[34] This suggests that a many downtown transit commuters and many more non-downtown transit commuters do not have access to automobiles.

The 2025 Plan

 

In 1998, the voters of Charlotte-Mecklenburg approved the 2025 Plan, composed of transit improvements intended to reduce traffic congestion and air pollution. Generally, the 2025 Plan called for development of what was referred to as five rapid transit corridors and improved express bus service (light rail is generally not rapid transit)[35].

 

Light rail was to be built in the north and south corridors.

 

Express busways were to be built in the Independence Avenue, University and Airport corridors. Busway service was to be provided in the North Corridor, in addition to light rail.

 

The 2025 Plan was to cost $1.085 billion  over 25 years, including $760 million for building transit lines (bus rapid transit and light rail), $71,million in other capital costs and $254 million in operating costs for expanded bus service (Figure #6).[36]

 

Figure 6

 

 

The 2025 Plan assumed that land use planning in Charlotte-Mecklenburg would be significantly altered to improve the operation of the transit system. More residential and commercial development would be established within the five transit corridors (within one-half mile of stations),[37] while lower densities would be sought in the “wedges” between the corridors.

 

In the intervening months, the Metropolitan Transit Commission (MTC) has been established and planning for transit construction has proceeded.

 

THE SOUTH CORRIDOR

 

The first transit line to be subjected to detailed planning is in the South Corridor, from Uptown to Pineville. CATS and MTC have produced a Major Investment Study[38] that reviewed alternative routes and service strategies. The MIS generally found the Norfolk Southern rail right of way to be the most desirable. The most important service strategies were:

 

A light rail line that would be augmented by feeder buses.

 

A bus rapid transit system.

 

These alternatives were compared to a “No Build” Alternative, which projected impacts if all of the other four transit corridors were build, but not the South Corridor.

 

The Light Rail Alternative

 

Based upon the 2025 Plan, a light rail line is proposed in the South Corridor. This represents the first of five corridors that would be developed under the 2025 Plan. A Major Investment Study has been published,[39] which outlines an alternatives analysis that included different alignments and technology options (bus and light rail). The light rail line from Uptown to Pineville has emerged as the “locally preferred alternative,” which is being submitted to the federal government for funding approval.

Ridership

 

The MIS projects daily ridership in the South Corridor under the Light Rail Alternative at 15,800 in 2025. It is projected that overall CATS ridership in Charlotte-Mecklenburg would rise from a projected 90,000 daily passenger trips under the No Build Alternative[40] to 101,200 by 2025.[41]

 

Typically, new light rail systems attract one-half or more of their ridership from existing bus riders.[42] However,  unlike other communities that have built light rail, Charlotte does not have a strong bus ridership base to feed light rail. Indeed, light rail systems alone in San Diego, Los Angeles, Portland and St. Louis carry more daily riders than the entire Charlotte transit system. In each of these urban areas, light rail represents no more than a third of transit system ridership.

 

Data in the MIS further indicates that the transit system would attract approximately 11,200  projected new riders daily (riders who do not presently use transit) as a result of the South Corridor Light Rail Line. However, only 50 percent of the ridership increase would occur in the light rail corridor.[43] While the South Corridor Light Rail Line ridership figures (5,600 new daily riders) themselves appear to be reasonable, it seems implausible that the corridor improvements would generate such a significant ridership increase outside the corridor. It would be more likely that there would be little or no attributable increase outside the corridor. As a result, it is estimated that the new ridership attributable to the project would be no more than 6,000.

Transit Market Share

According to the MIS, the South Corridor Light Rail Line would increase transit’s market share in the South Corridor, from 2.2 percent to 3.5 percent, a rise of 1.3 percentage points (Figure #7).[44] Within Charlotte-Mecklenburg, the South Corridor Light Rail Line would increase transit’s share of trips 0.2 percentage points, from 1.6 percent to 1.8 percent (Figure #8).[45] The Bus Rapid Transit Alternative, which would achieve the highest ridership of any strategy studied, would add another 0.1 percentage points in the South Corridor and would attract the same market share as the Light Rail Alternative throughout Charlotte-Mecklenburg.

 

Thus, even if the ridership projected by the MIS is achieved, the increase in transit’s market share will be very small, whether in the South Corridor or in all of Charlotte-Mecklenburg.

 

Figure 7

 

 

Figure 8

Capital Costs

The capital cost for the South Corridor Light Rail Line is projected at $331.1 million .[46] This compares to the South Corridor Light Rail Line projected cost as contained in the 2025 Plan of $227 million (1998$). Since the 1998 election, the cost of this line has increased  33.5 percent ($88 million), excluding inflation related costs. The Charlotte Area Transit System federal “New Starts Report,” misleadingly indicates that the constant 1999 dollar cost is $254 million, attributing the widely reported cost increase to $331 million as being due to inflation.  CATS breakdown of that cost increase which is included as Appendix C, indicates that only $16 million of the $77.1 million increase is attributable to inflation. 

 

In interviews General Manager Ron Tober has attributed the cost increases not to inflation but to design and construction management, which the “initial figure didn’t include.”[47] However, the 2025 plan specifically indicates these cost are included;  "The total cost also includes design and construction administration/management fees, and a contingency to account for the conceptual level of engineering and to allow for unknowns (30 percent for most items)."[48]  The South Corridor Major Investment Study which was completed in Spring 2000 also indicates these costs are included in its $254 million capital cost projection;  "Capital costs are in 1999 dollars and reflect all components of costs including design, construction, vehicles, right-of-way, and estimated contingencies."[49]

CATS documents also indicate that a 10 percent contingency has also been added. This is in addition to the 30 percent construction contingency that was included in the 2025 Plan.

 

MTC/CATS uses the erroneous $254 million dollar number to calculate cost per new rider that is a critical number in the Federal Transit Administration analysis process.  The choice of light rail in the south corridor over bus rapid transit and HOV lanes was based on the lower $254 million figure which produces a more favorable comparison.  In fact, the $77 million cost increase was not announced until the Charlotte City Council, the Mecklenburg County Commission and the MTC had chosen light rail as the preferred option.  Since the cost of the light rail option has increased none of the above bodies have reviewed their choice of light rail in the South Corridor as the preferred option with its now much higher cost that threatens the viability of  transit in the other corridors.

 

An  actual failure to include design and construction management in the 2025 Plam and Major Investment Study  would represent a serious oversight in the preparation of  these reports and would call into question the competence and validity of the entire process. [50]  The conflicting and erroneous explanations for these cost increases is equally troublesome and seriously damages the credibility of MTC and its General Manager.   The misreporting of  these cost increases to the Federal Transit Administration demonstrates how far Charlotte and many communities will apparently go to obtain federal dollars for their local projects. 

 

This rate of cost escalation, is approximately 15 percent per year.  Such a rate is not unusual for projects in the planning stage. Among light rail projects in planning for which federal funds were being sought in 1999 and 2000, average annual costs rose 21.0 percent.[51]

 

But more importantly, regardless of the real reasons for the higher current  projected capital cost of the South Corridor Light Rail Line, it is well below that of similar projects in planning around the nation. The South Corridor Light Rail Line is planned to be 11 miles in length, with an average cost per mile of $29 million. Among the 14 similar light rail projects for which federal funding was being sought in 1999 or 2000, the average cost per mile is $46.3 million,[52] more than 60  percent more than the projected cost of the South Corridor Light Rail Line. Only two of the of the 14 projects in planning are projected to cost less than $40 million. Ten of the 19 projects are projected to generally cost in the $40 million to $50 million range.[53] At the national average, the South Corridor Light Rail Line would cost $509 million, $282 million more than originally forecast.  CATS General Manager Ron Tober seems to recognize the potential volatility of present cost projections:

 

Once the engineering phase is complete in fall 2002, we will then get good cost estimates …[54]

 

Based upon the 2025 Plan cost projections submitted to the voters, this would create funding shortage of $282 million for the first of the five transit corridors (Figure #9).[55] Such an overrun would reduce funding for the other four corridors, which were to have cost $533 million according to the 2025 Plan, by nearly one-half.

 

Figure 9

 

Cost overruns of this magnitude are not unusual in such projects. A National Academy of Sciences report evaluated the international experience in transportation system projections (such as fixed guideways) and found:[56]

 

... the main lessons are that cost overruns of 50 to 100 percent are common for large transportation infrastructure projects: overruns above 100 percent are not unusual.

 

Consistent with the international findings, the  United States Department of Transportation found that urban rail systems averaged cost overruns of 46 percent in a 1989 report.[57]

Operating Costs

The South Corridor Light Rail Line is projected to cost  $12.8 annually to operate compared to the No Build Alternative. This represents a substantial increase in relation to the operating cost  contained in the 2025 Plan. That prior projection placed annual operating costs at $5.9 million (Figure #10).[58] In the less than two years since the voters approved the 2025 Plan, operating costs for the South Corridor Light Rail Line have escalated 118 percent. This would create a funding shortfall of $6.9 million annually relative to the 2025 Plan, which would amount to approximately $136 million through 2025.[59]

 

 

Figure 10

 

.

 

Cost Escalation

 

Based upon MTC projections, the present capital and operating cost overrun through 2025 (compared to the 2025 Plan) amounts to $226 million (approximately $88 million in capital costs plus $138 million in operating costs). However, the cost overrun is likely to be significantly higher, based upon the national experience. At the national average, a capital cost overrun of $282 million would occur, raising the overall cost overrun to $440 million ($282 million capital cost overrun plus $138 million operating cost overrun).

 

Whether the MIS cost escalation or that predicted herein occurs, it seems clear that the transit system promised the voters under the 2025 Plan cannot be delivered with the available revenue.

 

Cost per New Passenger

The New Starts Report and  MIS[60] indicates that the cost per new one-way ride would be $10.76. The recent escalation of capital costs to $315 million as discussed above would raise the cost per new one-way ride to $12.39. The annual cost per new commuter (person using transit to and from work every day) would thus be $5,575.[61] This is not a one-time cost. It is a cost that would be incurred every year for every new commuter.  The same amount of money could lease each new commuter a Ford Taurus or similar car in perpetuity (Figure #11).

 

Figure 11

Annual Cost per New Commuter per MIS

Equals Lease Rate for a New Ford Taurus

 

 

 

However, as indicated above, it is likely that capital costs will be much higher than projected, and project ridership is likely to be much lower. If the light rail line costs $509 million and the number of new riders is 6,000 (instead of 11,200), as projected above, the cost per new one-way ride would increase to $37.22, or $16,749 annually. This is enough to lease each new commuter a Jaguar XJ8 and a Chevrolet Suburban in perpetuity. Over a 40 year career, the cost would be approximately $670,000. (Figure #12).

 

 

 

 

 

Figure 12

Annual Cost per New Commuter More Likely to

Equal Lease Rate for a New Chevrolet Suburban and a Jaguar XJ8.

 

 

 

Impact on Traffic

The MIS does not provide specific projections with respect to the impact on traffic congestion of the South Corridor Light Rail Line. It is clear, however, that little impact is expected.

 

As was noted above, the MIS projects a somewhat small 0.2 percentage point increase in transit’s share of trips in Charlotte-Mecklenburg and a 1.3 percentage point increase in the South Corridor. Even if all of transit’s market share increase were to come from automobiles, this level of modal shift would be imperceivable.

 

The insignificance of light rail’s impact on  congestion is illustrated by applying all of the transit ridership increase to the adjacent Interstate 77. If all of the new travel on transit as a result of the South Corridor Light Rail Line were taken from I-77, a 0.5 percent reduction in traffic would occur (Figure #13). Over the same period, the number of new cars added to the freeway would be 300 times the number diverted to light rail.[62] Of course, the small amount of passenger demand transferred from automobiles to the South Corridor Light Rail Line will be dispersed throughout the entire south corridor street and freeway network, so that the impact will be even less perceivable than shown in the figure below.

 

 

 

Figure 13

 

Chart enlarged to make “To Light Rail” visible.

 

Impact on Air Pollution

According to the MIS, the South Corridor Light Rail Line would have “no significant impact” on air pollution. This is a reasonable conclusion, in light of the miniscule traffic impact projected by the MIS. Indeed, the New Starts Report indicates that the reduction in each of the three “criteria pollutants” would be less than 0.3 percent (Table #1 and Figure #14).[63]

 

 

 

Figure 14

 

Speed

 

The South Corridor Light Rail Line is not likely to be particularly attractive as an alternative to automobile commuting because of its slow operating speed. With multiple grade crossings, it is likely to operate at well below average automobile speeds in the corridor.

 

Impact on Development

 

Light rail is often promoted as a mechanism of urban development.  The expectation is that light rail will concentrate development, thereby reshaping the city into spatial patterns that reduce automobile dependency, while generating more favorable traffic and access. For example the Portland’s planners anticipated that light rail would result in a “reurbanization” of the corridor, causing a rapid conversion to high density uses in the light rail corridor, a reduction in the growth rate outside the corridor, a reduction in automobile use and ownership, among other impacts.^[64] In fact, nothing of the sort has occurred. Light rail development has been heavily subsidized (below), growth continues to be focused in outlying areas, not along the light rail corridor, and automobile usage has continued to increase at a far greater rate than transit use (above).^[65]

 

Light rail’s development impacts are somewhat more problematic.

 

Light rail has generally not produced development, much less reshaped cities. The majority of development cited by light rail promoters has been either government projects or tax subsidized. Portland and St. Louis have built publicly financed sports facilities (stadiums) and convention centers (as have  cities without light rail, such as Detroit, Charlotte, Seattle and Minneapolis). Portland’s transit oriented residential developments have received tax subsidies and tax abatements. And, the city of Portland now grants 10 years of property tax abatement for developments within walking distance of light rail stations. Tax and subsidy policy, not light rail, is the driver of such development.

 

If higher densities of develop should occur adjacent to light rail lines, it will make traffic and air pollution worse, not better. This is because the overwhelming majority of trips to new developments will continue to be by automobile. This is illustrated by Atlanta’s Midtown. Midtown’s can be classified as transit oriented commercial development, and is served by MARTA’s metro system. Yet this transit oriented development, largely built since the metro system opened, has produced greater traffic congestion, not less. Recent research indicates that more than 90 percent of commuters to this growing employment center commute by automobile, instead of transit .^[66] Virtually the same problem exists with respect to transit oriented residential development. For example, the transit oriented development around the Ballston, Virginia (Washington, DC) subway station is five times as dense as neighboring communities, and generates four times as many vehicle trips per acre.^[67] Not only is traffic congestion worsened around the transit oriented development, but air pollution is an order of magnitude worse, because of the inevitably slower average speed of vehicles in the area (below).

 

Any significant new commercial and residential development along light rail lines will increase both traffic congestion and air pollution. The overwhelming majority of travel will continued to be by automobile and that travel will be concentrated in a smaller area if rail generates significant development.

 

If transit were able to “reshape” cities, then it would have already occurred in Washington and Atlanta. In these two urban areas, nearly $15 billion has been spent to build expensive heavy rail systems that radiate from the downtown areas. Because of their higher operating speeds and the number of lines that have been built, the development that they have encouraged is far greater than could be expected from the slower and less comprehensive light rail systems, such as is proposed in Charlotte. At a few suburban stations there has been office and residential construction. But work trip market shares at these locations is far lower than in the historic downtown areas (the case of Atlanta’s Mid Town was described above), as the overwhelming percentage of commuting to the new jobs has been by automobile.  As a result, traffic congestion throughout the Washington and Atlanta urbanized areas has become among the worst in the nation.^[68]

 

Perhaps the most aggressive land use impact claims have been made with respect to the Dallas light rail system One transit system commissioned study[69] found that light rail has led to higher property values in Dallas and compared what it considered to be comparable areas along the light rail lines and in non-light rail areas. There are, however, problems with this study:

Some of the properties evaluated in the Dallas analysis are not within walking distance of a light rail station (the study uses the transit standard walking distance of 1/4 mile).

 

The light rail/non-light rail comparison areas listed in the study do not appear to be comparable. For example, the non-light rail areas do not include any significant office centers that are comparable to the office centers along the North Central Expressway (which is also the route of the light rail line). There are numerous other examples of commercial property that could have been included.

 

The study uses a very small sample of properties, such that exclusion of single properties from the analysis can have significant impact on the overall results.

 

Most important, the study fails to factor out the impact of rebuilding and expanding the North Central Expressway, which is also the route of the northern segment of the light rail line. The study simply assumes that all added value is the result of light rail. It would be expected that the North Central Expressway, which in its expanded portions along the light rail line will carry many more people than light rail, would have dominant impact on property values in comparison to light rail. [70]

 

Finally, in Dallas, as in Denver, Chicago, Seattle and other cities, there is a resurgence of inner city development that is occurring in many areas, not just areas located adjacent to rail lines.

Why Selected

 

The South Corridor Light Rail Line has been adopted as the locally preferred alternative based upon “quality of life considerations.” These include lower noise and pollution levels relative to Bus Rapid Transit. The most important reason, however, was the anticipation that light rail would generate significant development. As was noted above, market based (non-subsidized, private) development has generally not occurred adjacent to light rail lines. The MIS does not consider the potential negative impact on the quality of life due to the higher levels of localized traffic congestion and air pollution that the 2025 Plan implies would occur if significantly higher density development occurs.

 

The Bus Rapid Transit Alternative

Description

 

The MIS also evaluated a Bus Rapid Transit system that would operate in the same corridor as the proposed South Corridor Light Rail Line.

 

Ridership

 

The MIS projects the BRT daily ridership at 16,600, slightly more than the 15,400 daily trips on South Corridor Light Rail Line. This CATS/MTC projection  undermines the misperception that discretionary riders (those with automobiles available for their trip) are as inclined to ride buses as rail where similar service quality is provided. It further reaffirms federal research indicating that there is no inherent market preference for rail over bus.[71] The impact on the overall transit system, however, is more significant, with daily ridership rising 13,800 from the “no build” scenario, compared to the 11,200 increase projected for the South Corridor Light Rail Line (Figures #7 and #*).

 

Capital Costs

 

The BRT alternative is projected to require capital costs of $166,1 million. This is approximately $155 million less than the cost of the South Corridor Light Rail Line. Even so, this BTR  capital cost is  44 percent above that projected for the South Corridor bus rapid transit alternative reviewed in the 2025 Plan, which was to have cost $115.1 million. This 44 percent cost escalation is more than three times the cost increase associated with the light rail alternative in the same corridor. The original capital cost estimate converted to $10.5 million per mile, itself 12 percent above the $9.4 million national average of bus rapid transit systems in planning.[72] The MIS cost projection converts to $15.1 million, 71 percent above the national average. It appears, as a result, that the capital costs of the Bus Rapid Transit system could be significantly overstated.

 

Operating Costs

 

The BRT is projected to cost $14.2 million more annually to operate than the No-Build Alternative. This is $1.4 annually more than the incremental operating cost projection for the South Corridor Light Rail Line. In contrast to capital costs, the 2025 Plan did not project a bus rapid transit operating cost in the South Corridor. However, the MIS projected annual operating cost exceeds by 24 percent the combined projected operating cost of all four other busway corridors that are identified in the 2025 Plan University, Independence Avenue and Airport). The Bus Rapid Transit Alternative is so expensive to operate that it would cost more than one-half the present operating cost of the entire Charlotte transit system. The operating costs for the Bus Rapid Transit Alternative appear to be implausibly high.

 

Potential Planning Bias

 

Former Southern California Rapid Transit District (Los Angeles) Controller Thomas A. Rubin has recently recounted a number of strategies used by planning agencies that have pre-selected rail alternatives as opposed to bus rapid transit alternatives. He refers to this practice as the “butchers thumb on the scale.”[73] The inexplicably higher operating and capital cost escalation of the South Corridor bus rapid transit alternative in relation to the light rail alternative   could be such an instance.

 

 

 

The Bus Alternative Could Deliver on 2025 Plan Promises

 

The Bus Rapid Transit Alternative would perform only marginally better in attracting new transit ridership. However, the already apparent cost escalation of the light rail line threatens the ability to deliver the five transit corridors in the 2025 Plan system (below).  Even with the bus rapid transit system cost escalation, it is well within the budget for the South Corridor as presented in the 2025 Plan. In light of the impact on the overall program, the selection of the expensive and escalating South Corridor Light Rail Line as the preferred alternative is problematic.  Such a decision could be reflective of a  bias for light rail regardless of its cost or impact (Table #2).[74]