Were Tammany's Critics Anti-New York?
Twelve Anti-Transit Myths: A Conservative Critique, by Paul M. Weyrich and William S. Lind attempts to refute arguments made in opposition to
overly expensive urban rail projects. The paper, sponsored by the business members (vendors) of the American Public Transportation
Association (APTA) responds to
what it characterizes as the "anti-transit troubadours," which include Wendell Cox (and the The Public Purpose), The Brookings Institution,
the Heritage Foundation, Randal O'Toole, the US Department of Transportation, Don Pickrell, Tom Rubin, Clifford Winston, John Charles, the Reason Public Policy Foundation, the Georgia Public
Policy Foundation, the Goldwater Institute, Harvard University, the Texas Public Policy Foundation, the Sutherlin Institute, Sam Staley, John Semmons, the Cascade Policy Institute, the Buckeye Institute and others.
One certainly finds one's self in auspicious company!
The frivolously styled and sometimes taunting piece provides little in "on-point" refutation to the criticisms it cites.
Were Tammany's Critics Anti-New York?" (this statement)
examines the
APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper's discussion of some issues raised by Wendell Cox and The Public Purpose. The APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper
does not provide on-point
refutation of any point raised by Wendell Cox or The Public Purpose. Instead, the paper "changes the subject" or makes inferences that
The Public Purpose has taken positions that it has not.
Thus, it is not necessary to respond in detail. A few points will convey the sense and extent to which the APTA-Weyrich-Lind
paper fails to refute the critics.
Were Tammany's Critic's Anti-New York? Getting the Labels Right
The APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper broadly characterizes critics of high cost urban rail projects as "anti-transit troubadours." This could not be further
from the truth.
Who Are the Transit Advocates?
The test of transit advocacy is not the support of excessively expensive strategies, it is rather support of measures that increase public transit
service levels and ridership. On that score, the "troubadours" are more pro-transit than those who lead and those who sell their products to transit.
Generally, the "troubadours" are reformers who support transit strategies that would increase service levels and ridership. For example, rapid bus systems and competitive
contracting have been proven to be superior strategies with respect to effectiveness and cost efficiency. Implementation of such strategies,
favored by most of the reformers, would increase transit service levels and ridership. Favoring more transit and more transit ridership is pro-transit,
not anti-transit.
Public Transit: Hijacked by Special Interests:
Regrettably, much of the transit industry is subject to control by special interests that benefit from higher than necessary transit costs (transit
unions, management whose compensation depends on higher budgets and larger staff sizes and companies that plan and build expensive
rail lines). This reflects
what Mancur Olson characterized as the incentives to "take" being stronger than the incentives to "make,"
(Power and Prosperity, 2000). This occurs when an institution, such as transit, serves its internal interests first, and those of its
customers or clients second. Such behavior can be sustained in the long run only if the organization is a monopoly
(government or statutory monopoly),
shielded the competitive influences
that would otherwise require sound
strategies and fiscal discipline. Unlike the reformers,
the transit "powers that be" are wedded to extravagant strategies that preclude the substantial service expansions and ridership increases
that could be achieved within the constraints of current resources. In that regard, it is transit leadership that is anti-transit. Indeed,
future historians could well
conclude that transit had been run by its enemies during the late 20th and early 21st centuries.
The Reformers: Pro-Mobility and Pro-Access: Finally, the reformers are generally not anti-rail, they are pro-access and pro-mobility. They propose strategies that would provide higher levels
of mobility and access throughout urban areas, without regard to the mode of travel. For example, The Public Purpose supports urban rail where it is appropriate. This is illustrated by an
op-ed by Wendell Cox published the Apple Daily supporting
the proposed expansion of Hong Kong's rail system (the Apple Daily is Hong Kong's second largest newspaper).
The Public Purpose favors the most effective and cost efficient transportation strategies, rail or otherwise.
Transit and Tammany: Institutional Objectives Conflicting with Public Objectives:
For the transit industry to characterize the reformers
as anti-transit is akin to the Tammany Hall political
machine characterizing the late 19th century reform movement as anti-New York (which it did). Tammany's interests were often at odds
with those of New York's people. Similarly, the transit industry's interests are at odds with those of the riders and taxpayers on very
fundamental issues.
Changing the Subject: Market Share is Not Ridership
Five quotations are provided on transit ridership trends, including that of Wendell Cox (page 6):
The Challenge: To refute the declining market share point, the APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper would have to show that from 1983 to 1997, transit
market share was increasing in the new rail cities. The APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper provides no such evidence, because there is none. The argument
by Wendell Cox is thus not contradicted by the APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper.
Logical Fallacy #1: Changing the Subject:
Instead the APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper changes the subject. While claiming that the quotations are wrong "on every point," the two page refutation that follows does not
even mention the term "market share." Instead, the APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper talks of rising ridership from a recent base. Ridership and market share are different
concepts and terms. Transit "market share" measures the percentage of urban travel that occurs on transit. When market share is increasing, transit
is becoming comparatively more important as a mode of travel, When market share is decreasing, transit is becoming less important. It is possible for
ridership to increase and for market share to fall at the same time. This occurs when the increase in transit ridership is at a lower rate than the
increase in other forms of travel. This is what has happened in recent years. From 1990 to 1999, transit ridership rose 11.4 percent. At the same
time urban personal vehicle use (automobile, SUV and personal truck) increased more that twice as much, at 24.0 percent. The result is that public
transit's market share dropped 10.0 percent, from 2.05 percent to 1.84 percent. During the 1990s, public transit captured just 0.98 percent of new
urban travel, less than one-half its market share at the beginning of the decade.
Inaccurate Characterization: When Leasing Jaguars Costs Less than Taking the Train
The APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper criticizes (page 37) what has become one of the most quoted and effective criticisms of extravagant rail projects, quoting Wendell Cox (and others):
The Challenge: To refute this argument, the APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper would need to show that it would not be more expensive to lease each
new commuter a car
in perpetuity. No such evidence is provided. Indeed, as is shown below, project planning reports routinely report annual costs per new
commuter
that are higher than the annual cost of leasing a new car.
Logical Fallacy #2: Inaccurate Characterization: Instead, the APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper inaccurately characterizes the Jaguar Argument
in the quote by
Wendell Cox
The Jaguar Argument: Straight From the Light Rail Reports: In fact, light rail planning reports have shown over and over again that the cost per new commuter would exceed the cost of leasing each new commuter a new car in perpetuity. The annual cost of light rail systems per new passenger, as indicated in these reports, is high enough to lease a car for each new rider who commutes to work every day on light rail. For example, Denver's Southeast light rail line, now under construction, is projected to have a cost per new rider of $18.40. For a new rider who commutes both ways to work every day, this calculates to $8,280.00, $264.00 more than the annual cost of leasing a new Lexus 400 (a $55,000 car).
Light Rail and Jaguars for the Few: The Jaguar Argument stands because so few new riders are attracted to light rail. For example, in Houston, approximately 20 million trips are taken by car and transit every day. Of that, less than two percent are by transit (300,000). Using some of the most aggressive planning assumptions in transit history, Houston Metro's now under construction light rail line is projected to attract barely 8,000 new trips per day, or 0.04 percent of daily travel (one out of every 2,500 trips). Light rail (like the symbolic Jaguar) can only be provided for an elite few, because of its great expense. In Houston, the other 99.96 percent of trips will simply not be served. Not Checking Sources: You Can't Believe Everything You Read in the Paper
The APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper also relies on secondary sources.
Logical Fallacy #3: Not Checking the Sources:
For example, the APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper cites an Atlanta Constitution editorial in describing proposals (page 61)
made by Wendell Cox in a Georgia Public Policy Foundation (GPFF) study. The Constitution
had both misreported and oversimplified the GPPF proposals. The APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper could have averted this error by directly consulting the
GPPF study, which has been available on the Internet for more than one year. Moreover, it is significant that the other metropolitan daily, the
Atlanta Journal has supported the GPPF study and findings in a number of editorials over the past year.
Assessment: No On-Point Refutation
The APTA-Weyrich-Lind paper fails to refute a single point cited from either The Public Purpose or Wendell Cox.
06 August 2001
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